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Coalitions – beyond the Politics of Centrality? 
 
CHARLES LEES 
 
 
This article explores a number of themes common to the work of Gordon Smith 
and to more formal models of coalition behaviour, with an empirical focus on 
coalition bargaining in the Federal Republic of Germany.  The article argues that 
numerical formation criteria alone are poor predictors of actual coalition 
outcomes, and that institutional structures and norms - particularly partisan 
ideology - play a decisive role.  The article draws parallels between de Swaan's 
'median legislator' theory and Smith's concept of the 'politics of centrality' and 
comes to two conclusions.  First, that the dynamics of coalition behaviour have 
remained remarkably stable, despite changes in the numerical composition and 
ideological range of the German party system.  Second, that the formation of the 
Red-Green coalition in 1998 does represent a change in those dynamics, but that 
there is no evidence to suggest that the Federal Republic is moving beyond the 
politics of centrality. 
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Introduction 
Gordon Smith's work, like all the best comparative politics scholarship, has held the line 
between the two extremes of hyper-empiricism, on the one hand, and over-abstraction on the 
other.  Back in the late 1970s, Smith the political scientist warned his colleagues that 'the 
pendulum (had) swung too far away' from abstract classification and 'simple typologies'.  
Such abstractions remained important, not least because 'they ... have the merit of bringing a 
wide range of experience under a relatively few headings, and give ... a useful summary from 
which we can proceed to a detailed differentiation' of political phenomena
1
.  Nevertheless, 
Smith the aesthete rejects the over-use of political science jargon and, when reviewing a book 
by Ian Budge and Hans Keman some years later, congratulated the authors on avoiding the 
kind of 'excessively turgid writing that gives comparative politics a bad name in some 
quarters'
2
. 
Budge and Keman's book deals in coalition theory, a sub-field that, at its best, yields 
up some of the most elegant formal modelling to be found in the discipline but is also prone 
to the kind of impenetrable techno-babble Smith detests.  Broadly speaking, work on coalition 
theory can be divided into two camps.  On the one hand, there is the 'European politics' 
literature
3
, derived inductively from empirical study of European party systems.  On the other, 
the more rigorous 'game theoretical' approach
4
 is grounded in the deductive method and tries - 
with varying degrees of success - to construct parsimonious models of coalition behaviour 
that are applicable across time and space.  These two approaches are like chalk and cheese, to 
the extent that Laver and Schofield regard them as 'so far apart that they have almost nothing 
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to contribute to one another'
5
, despite the efforts of Budge and Keman - and Laver and 
Schofield themselves - to bridge the divide between them. 
I would argue, however, that the gulf between the two approaches is not unbridgeable.  
Formal theory does not always provide a good 'fit' with the context of European party 
systems, particularly the role of ideology and other institutional norms but, as Smith insisted 
over twenty years ago, comparison between systems is impossible without some degree of 
abstraction.  Students of comparative politics will know that Smith's own work - on Germany 
and Western Europe more generally - has always been theoretically informed. 
The rest of this article explores some of the common themes addressed in both Smith's 
work on coalitions and in some of the more formal-deductive coalition literature.  The article 
takes a thematic approach, starting with Smith's concept of the 'politics of centrality', the 
centripetal dynamic that he regards as part of the 'efficient secret' of German democracy
6
.  It 
then discusses examines party systems - the political market-places in which coalition 
bargains are struck - and the role of the parties within them.  These issues are examined 
through the lens of formal 'economic' models of coalition formation, particularly the 
'minimum winning coalition' model.  The article demonstrates that such models fail to 
adequately predict or explain coalition politics in the Federal Republic, because they ignore 
the issues of (partisan) ideology and other institutional norms.  These are the rules of the 
game, and are often where economic models come unstuck: as such rules provide the 'friction' 
or 'stickiness' that prevents us drawing a direct analogy between party systems and the 
relatively frictionless markets assumed by neo-classical economics (from which such models 
are derived).  The article goes on to examine the issues of ideology and norms in more detail, 
whilst introducing a more sophisticated strand of 'policy-oriented' coalition theory: the 
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'minimum connected winning' and 'median legislator' models.  In each segment, the core 
assumptions of some of the formal models are sketched out and weighed against the empirical 
work of Smith and associated scholars, with an emphasis on Smith's work on coalition 
behaviour in the Federal Republic's party system.  The article demonstrates that, although they 
are methodologically distinct from one another, there is much common ground to be found 
between deductive policy-oriented models and Smith's more inductive approach (in particular, 
between the median legislator model and Smith's idea of the politics of centrality).  Finally, 
the article concludes with an assessment of whether the idea of the politics of centrality still 
holds true today. 
 
 
The Politics of Centrality 
Much of Smith's work is concerned with the idea of an 'efficient secret' - a benign 
configuration of institutional structures and norms, as well as partisan ideology - at the heart 
of the German polity.  It is this secret, which Smith calls 'the politics of centrality', that 
underpins the remarkable stability of the Federal Republic's political settlement
7
. 
In terms of institutional structures and norms, one can identify four key elements that 
re-enforce the politics of centrality.  First, Germany's system of proportional representation 
(augmented by a five percent hurdle to representation), which promotes a pattern of coalition 
government, limits the number of viable parties within the party system, and serves to shut 
out parties of the extreme right and left
8
.  Second, the idea of the Partienstaat, which raised 
the public esteem of political parties in the early post-war years, gave them a direct stake in 
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the maintainance of the State and the enhancement of its legitimacy, and thus discouraged the 
emergence of the 'anti-system' sentiment within the parties that helped undermine the Weimar 
Republic.  Third, 'Chancellor democracy' and the principle of Richtlinienkompetenz, which 
established the office of Federal Chancellor as primus inter pares, avoiding the constitutional 
tussles between Chancellor and President that characterised the Weimar years.  Fourth, the 
rule that requires the Bundestag to give a 'constructive vote of no confidence' before voting 
out an incumbent Chancellor.  These four elements serve to narrow the ideological range of 
'relevant' parties (parties that are considered to be koalitionsfähig), enhance the status of the 
Federal Chancellor as leader of the governing coalition, and increase the opportunity costs of 
either exit from an existing coalition or the formation of rival coalitions.  Taken together, they 
foster the qualities of ideological moderation, coalition discipline, and governmental 
stability
9
. 
In the first few decades of the Federal Republic, these qualities came to permeate the 
ideologies of the traditional mainstream parties, the CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD, all of whom 
'share a strong governing orientation'
10
.  In addition, the SPD's adoption of the Bad Godesberg 
programme in 1959 meant that a consensus existed between all of the mainstream parties 
about the broad parameters of the Federal Republic's political economy.  Consensus bred 
continuity in terms of policy making, which was further reinforced by high levels of coalition 
stability that led to only 'partial' changes of government (with each new coalition featuring 
one of the parties from the previous coalition)
11
.  Coalition bargaining between the parties 
involved the selective emphasis of broadly compatible elements within their ideological 
profiles.  Thus, coalition programmes involving the CDU/CSU and FDP focused on 
'bourgeois issues', such as property rights, whilst SPD-FDP programmes placed greater stress 
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on the 'social' dimension, particularly individual rights.  The one Grand Coalition to date drew 
upon the 'corporatist' instincts of both Volksparteien, most obviously in the SPD but also to be 
found within the 'catholic–social' wing of the CDU.  In short, a triangular party system 
evolved in which all three parties were koalitionsfähig along one of three dimensions.  This 
idea of a triangular relationship is associated with the work of Franz Pappi
12
 and is illustrated 
in Figure One, below. 
 
Figure One. The 'Pappi Model' of a triangular party system 
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Many formal coalition models build out from Anthony Downs'
13
 analogy of party systems as 
markets, with parties as firms competing with each other for voters who, in turn are analogous 
with consumers.  In the Downsian universe, the policy dimension is laid out one-
dimensionally along a single left/right continuum (although later models have often 
supplemented this with an additional dimension, often based on a authoritarian/libertarian or 
materialist/post-materialist dimension).  Under normal circumstances, it is assumed that the 
individual voter will have one ideal position along the continuum and that voters' preferences 
are fairly evenly distributed along it.  Theoretically, the distribution of these preferences in 
normal party systems resembles a classic bell-curve, with the aggregate reaching an 
equilibrium (and thus effectively a consensus) around the median of the distribution.  It is 
around this point, occupied by the 'median voter'
14
, that the office-seeking parties will 
manoeuvre in order to maximise votes.  By contrast, where an individual voter's preferences 
on different policy issues are more inconsistent, the bell-curve does not achieve this centrist 
equilibrium: fragmenting the party system and allowing space within it for extremist parties.  
In the last years of the Weimar Republic, for instance, this fragmentation was so profound 
that the centre collapsed and anti-system parties effectively constituted a 'wrecking majority' 
within the party system
15
. 
 Like markets, party systems display various degrees of differentiation: defined in such 
terms as the degree of concentration or deconcentration, partisan alignment or dealignment, 
dominant or cross-cutting cleavages.  Moreover, the opportunity costs of entry into the party 
system differ across time and space, not only because the appeal of a given political 'product' 
differs, but also due to system attributes such as voting rules (plurality versus proportional 
systems), barriers to representation (such as the five percent hurdle at the Federal level in 
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Germany), laws regulating internal party democracy, and so on.  Thus it is important to note 
that party systems are constrained arenas, in which the composition, stability and durability of 
coalitions are partly determined by system attributes. 
Smith's work on party systems does not use this market analogy, but he nevertheless 
recognised the importance of system attributes in determining the number of parties within 
the system, as well as the stability and effectiveness of governmental coalitions.  Using a 
typology based on the ideas of 'governing' and 'social' cohesion, Smith posits four simple 
classifications to encompass this potential for differentiation across party systems.  These are 
set out in Table One, below.  As Smith observes, there is no need for there to be a direct link 
between levels of governmental and social cohesion.  It is possible for a party system 
dominated by a single party, or small number of parties, to display high levels of 
governmental cohesion (in terms of stable, durable coalitions) whilst failing to enhance social 
integration.  Conversely, a diffused party system may create high levels of social cohesion - in 
the sense that all shades of political opinion have an effective 'voice' within the system - but 
not deliver the goods in terms of stable government. 
 
Table One.  The Major West European Types
16
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Dominance Majoritarian 
(Imbalanced) 
Governing cohesion 
  
  

 
(Fragile) 
Fragmentation Diffusion 
  Social cohesion  
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Smith considers majoritarian systems - displaying high levels of cohesion on both dimensions 
- to be the ideal type, as they deliver stable government and an integrated electorate.  
Majoritarian systems are often associated with two-party systems, but can work under certain 
circumstances in multi-party systems.  Thus the Federal Republic's party system, dominated 
by two 'balanced clusters'
17
 of parties, fulfils the criteria of a majoritarian system.  At the time 
of writing, Smith was referring to the cluster of the SPD and FDP in coalition, with the 
CDU/CSU in opposition.  Obviously, the decline of the total Volkspartei vote since then, and 
the subsequent emergence of the Greens and PDS has changed this dynamic somewhat (this is 
discussed later in the article).  Nevertheless, Smith's assertion can be supported by the kind of 
market analogy posited by Downs and others.  High levels of governmental cohesion increase 
the opportunity costs of entry into, and exit from, a given coalition, whilst high levels of 
social cohesion raises the opportunity costs for new entrants into the political market-place
18
.  
Combined together, majoritarian systems can create a virtuous circle of coalition stability and 
duration.  The corollary to this is that under such systems the number of potential coalitions 
that can form is limited.  Continuing the market analogy, if majoritarian party systems are 
markets they are not open ones. 
 
Political parties as firms 
Neo-classical economic theory often assumes the existence of perfect competition within 
markets, but in practice this is often not the case.  Markets are often oligopolistic, in other 
words dominated by a small number of large firms.  In some cases, they are characterised by 
the presence of cartels, groups of firms that co-operate together in order to 'rig' the market and 
shut out potential competitors.  In relatively open economies, oligopolistic markets are 
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tolerated, but cartels are looked upon as undesirable and regulators often act to break them up.  
Nevertheless, cartel-like activity continues to take place in many markets. 
The analogy of the oligopolistic market is easily applied to the German party system - 
especially at the Federal level.  Table Two, below, demonstrates how the political market 
place 
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Table Two. The Rise and Decline of the German 'Party Oligopoly'. 
Federal Elections: 1949-1998 
L 49 53 57 61 65 69 72 76 80 83 87 90 94 98 
KPD/PDS               
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became increasingly dominated by a limited number of parties during the first three decades 
after the establishment of the Federal Republic.  I call this state of affairs a 'party oligopoly'.  
However, the last two decades have been marked by two systemic junctures that have served 
to undermine this party oligopoly.  The first, in 1983, took place when the Greens entered the 
Bundestag following the federal elections of that year.  The second, in 1990, took place after 
the first all-German Federal elections, when the PDS entered the Bundestag.  The table 
demonstrates, first, a thirty year period of ongoing party system concentration, in which the 
picture is one party oligopoly, dominated by the two big Volksparteien, and, second, the two 
systemic junctures which have served to break down this party oligopoly and shift the centre 
of gravity within the party system towards the political left. 
 
Consequences for numerical coalition formation critieria 
Despite this shift to the political left over the last twenty years, it was not until 1998 that the 
right-of-centre Kohl government was unseated by the SPD and Greens.  One can think of two 
obvious reasons why this might be the case: first, that the numerical composition of the 
Federal Republic's party system did not change sufficiently to oust the Kohl government and, 
second, that there were ideological constraints that prevented the formation of an alternative 
coalition. 
Let us leave aside the issue of ideology (which is discussed later in this article) for the 
moment, and concentrate on the number of parties within the party system.  Theorists such as 
Riker
19
 and Gamson
20
 concentrate on coalition size as being the key structural attribute that 
determines coalition formation.  All parties are assumed to be office seeking and will attempt 
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to gain admission to any coalition that may form.  Riker predicts that parties will try to create 
coalitions that are only as large as they believe will ensure winning, in order to maximise the 
payoffs to each coalition member. In its pure theoretical form, this will result in a 'minimum 
winning' coalition of 50 percent plus one vote.  However, in practice, Riker accepts that 
slightly larger 'minimal winning' coalitions are more likely to form.  Gamson gives the 
coalition formation 'game' a different emphasis and argues that parties will try and form a 
'cheapest winning' coalition.  The key difference is that Gamson assumes that parties would 
rather be a relatively large member of a small coalition than a junior partner in a bigger 
coalition, even when the tangible benefits of doing so are broadly comparable.  If numerical 
criteria are decisive in determining the number and composition of possible coalitions within 
a given party system, one of the logical consequences of a party oligopoly is that this number 
will be limited.  Likewise, as an oligopoly breaks down, the possibilities should increase.  
Indeed, in game theoretical terms, the expansion of the party system from three to five parties 
should increase this number exponentially
21
.  However, if one looks at the actual size and 
composition of coalitions formed over this period at the Federal level, this is not the case.  
These are set out in Table Three, below. 
If one regards the CDU/CSU's combined Bundestag faction as effectively a single 
party, Table Three demonstrates that, throughout the period from 1949 to the present, the 
numerical composition of ruling Federal-level coalitions remains remarkably stable.  It is true 
that the numerical range includes a maximum of four parties during the period October 1953 
to October 1957 and an effective one-party government from July 1960 to November 1961, 
but the default number of parties in formal coalitions over this period is two (in 16 out of 19, 
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or 84 percent of the total ).  Moreover, all coalitions since 1961 have been composed of two 
parties. 
 
Table Three. The Composition of Federal-level Coalitions 1949-1998
22
 
Year Chancellor Parties No. of Parties* 
Sept. 1949 Adenauer I CDU/CSU, FDP, DP 3 
Oct. 1953 Adenauer II CDU/CSU, FDP/FVP, DP, BHE 4 
Oct. 1957 Adenauer III CDU/CSU, DP 2 (1) ** 
Nov. 1961 Adenauer IV CDU/CSU, FDP 2 
Oct. 1963 Erhard I CDU/CSU, FDP 2 
Oct. 1965 Erhard II CDU/CSU, FDP 2 
Dec. 1966 Kiesinger CDU/CSU, SPD 2 
Oct. 1969 Brandt I SPD, FDP 2 
Dec. 1972 Brandt II SPD, FDP 2 
May 1974 Schmidt I SPD, FDP 2 
Dec. 1976 Schmidt II SPD, FDP 2 
Nov. 1980 Schmidt III SPD, FDP 2 
Oct. 1982 Kohl I CDU/CSU, FDP 2 
Mar. 1983 Kohl II CDU/CSU, FDP 2 
Mar. 1987 Kohl III CDU/CSU, FDP 2 
Apr. 1989 Kohl IV CDU/CSU, FDP 2 
Dec. 1990 Kohl V CDU/CSU, FDP 2 
May. 1992 Kohl VI CDU/CSU, FDP 2 
Sept. 1998 Schröder I SPD, Greens 2 
*CDU/CSU treated as single party (based on Bundestag faction arrangements); ** the DP split in July 1960, with 
the majority of the party joining the CDU - effectively making Adenauer III a single-party government. 
 
 
From party oligopoly to party cartel? 
System attributes, such as the five percent hurdle to representation and the tendency for 
'overhang votes' to favour the big Volksparteien, have contributed to the closure of the party 
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system in the Federal Republic.  Nevertheless, over time two new competitors have entered 
the electoral market, with the subsequent erosion of the party oligopoly noted earlier.  So how 
is one to explain such high levels of coalition stability in the face of these changes? 
 The numerical criteria posited by Riker and Gamson only provide a partial 
explanation.  There have been two periods when Federal-level coalitions have, contrary to 
Riker and Gamson's predictions, constituted 'surplus majorities' – first, in the early years of 
the Federal Republic and, second, in the mid-to-late 1960s.  One explanation for this is that 
such surplus majorities allow the 'senior' party to absorb the smaller parties with which it is in 
coalition.  This would certainly explain the behaviour of the early Adenauer coalitions where, 
in a period of ongoing party system concentration, surplus majorities allowed the CDU to 
absorb smaller competitor parties on the political right
23
.  However, it would not explain the 
period of Grand Coalition between 1966 and 1969.  A more plausible explanation for both 
periods of surplus majority government is that such large majorities provide a 'comfort zone' 
for coalition management in times of political upheaval.  This explanation would account for 
both Adenauer II (1953-7) and the Kiesinger coalition
24
. 
If one discounts these two periods, Federal–level coalitions have avoided excessive 
surplus majorities.  Therefore, to some extent, Riker and Gamson's assertions appear to be 
supported by the evidence.  However, whilst avoiding unnecessarily large majorities, not all 
of the remaining coalitions formed over this period conform to the 'minimal winning' formula.  
This is particularly the case since the first juncture in 1983, when the Greens entered the 
Bundestag, thus increasing the number of potential coalition variants.  The disparity between 
theoretical and actual winning coalitions is set out in Table Four, below. 
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Table Four.  Bundestag Elections 1983-98
25
.  Predicted and Actual Coalition Outcomes 
(using numerical formation criteria) 
Date of Bundestag Election 
 06/03/83 25/01/87 02/12/90 16/10/94 27/09/98 
Seats in Bundestag 
CDU/CSU 244 223 319 294 245 
FDP 34 46 79 47 44 
SPD 193 186 239 252 298 
Greens 27 42 8 49 47 
PDS --- --- 17 30 35 
Total Seats 498 497 662 672 669 
Minimum Winner 250 249 332 337 335 
Minimal Winner SPD, FDP, 
Greens 
CDU/CSU, 
Greens 
SPD, FDP, 
PDS 
CDU/CSU, 
FDP 
CDU/CSU, 
FDP, Greens 
Surplus Majority 4 16 3 4 1 
Actual Winner CDU/CSU, 
FDP 
CDU/CSU, 
FDP 
CDU/CSU, 
FDP 
CDU/CSU, 
FDP 
SPD, Greens 
Surplus Majority 28 20 66 4 10 
Predicted? No No No Yes No 
 
 
Table Four demonstrates that only one of the actual coalitions formed after the last five 
Bundestag elections is the minimal winner in theoretical terms.  So how does one account for 
this?  One explanation is that, as the cosy party oligopoly has broken down over the last 
twenty years, the established parties have turned to cartel-like behaviour. The analogy of the 
cartel was introduced into the party systems literature some years ago by Katz and Mair
26
.  
'Cartel parties' are characterised by elite dominance, a centralised structure and a high degree 
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of alienation between office holding politicians and their activists.  Activists retain a high 
symbolic value as the legitimator of elites, but they are increasingly by-passed by them - 
especially when elites intend to co-operate with elites from other parties.  The cartel party 
model does not map exactly onto German parties, not least because the German federal 
structure is replicated within the parties themselves, thus weakening central control.  
Nevertheless, in terms of elite dominance and conditions of alienation between party elites 
and the membership, all of the major parties - including the Greens - conform to some degree 
to the cartel party model
27
. 
However, there are two problems with the cartel-party as an explanation for the 
persistence of surplus majority coalitions since 1983.  First, the marginalisation of the 
ordinary membership has made it easier for party elites to pursue strategies of political co-
operation with each other, including forming coalitions
28
.  The logic of the cartel party model 
is that party elites are able to forge coalition agreements in the face of opposition from the 
membership: in other words, party elites enjoy a high degree of autonomy.  Therefore, the 
cartel party model per se does not necessarily predict a closing of coalition options, given that 
elite autonomy might increase the number of possible coalitions that could form (as the 
membership has little or no veto power over potential coalitions).  The second problem is that 
the cartel party model does not provide an explanation for why parties would act in ways that 
are, on the face of it, against their interests - either by joining surplus majority coalitions when 
they could be members of alternatives with a smaller majority (like the FDP in 1983 and the 
Greens in 1998), or by inviting 'junior' parties to join a coalition when other small parties 
would provide a smaller majority (as the CDU/CSU did in 1987, and the SPD did in 1998).  
  18 
Clearly, there are other system attributes at work - relating to partisan ideology and other 
institutional norms. 
 
 
Ideology and Institutional Norms 
Policy-oriented coalition models 
Table Four demonstrates what coalition theorists have known since the 1960s - that models 
based on numerical formation criteria alone are not only poor predictors of coalition 
outcomes, they also have very little explanatory value.  Because of this, theorists began to 
factor in some kind of 'policy dimension'.  Early policy-oriented work, such as that by 
Axelrod
29
, builds upon office-seeking models and introduces the policy dimension as a 
secondary formation criterion. His model assumes that office-seeking remains the central 
strategic goal of all players, but members of the successful coalition will ideally be adjacent to 
one another along a single Downsian Left-Right ideological continuum – in other words they 
will be 'ideologically adjacent'.  Such ideological adjacency will serve to minimise conflicts of 
interest.  Therefore, Axelrod's model predicts that the 'minimal connected winning' coalition 
will be the most likely outcome
30
. 
Although Axelrod's model assumes ideological adjacency, it has no conception of the 
ideological distance between parties and cannot pick up the nuances of ideological conflict.  
However, subsequent work by de Swaan
31
 takes the potential for conflict between 
ideologically adjacent parties into account.  De Swaan argues that winning coalitions will be 
those that are not only a minimal connected winning option (after Axelrod) but are also, 
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ceteris paribus, the option with the smallest ideological range.  The policy dimension remains 
a single Downsian Left-Right axis, running from progressivism to conservatism and all 
parties are assumed to be rational actors – with transitive preference orderings of all potential 
coalitions, based upon their relative proximity to the median or 'Mparty' within the legislature.  
De Swaan's 'median legislator' or 'median party' model assumes that the party that controls the 
median legislator in any potential coalition is decisive because it blocks the axis along which 
any connected winning coalition must form.  Any party that is the 'Mparty' (median within the 
legislature) and, in particular, the 'Mparty(k)' (controlling the median legislator within a 
potential coalition) must be included in any ideologically connected winning coalition. 
The 'median legislator' model has considerable predictive power across time and 
space.  Over thirty years ago, de Swaan's own tests yielded a 69 per cent prediction rate of 
actual outcomes from data on European coalition processes
32
.  Because of this predictive 
power, the 'median legislator' model has become part of the theoretical toolkit for researchers 
of coalition behaviour in many European polities.  In the German context, a good example of 
this is the relatively recent work by Klingemann and Volkens on Federal-level coalitions.  
Using data from the period 1949 to 1987, Klingemann and Volkens demonstrate that all 
Federal-level coalitions that formed during this period contained the party controlling the 
median legislator within the Bundestag
33
.  Moreover, the Mparty has normally been the FDP. 
 
Bringing Smith back in 
Klingemann and Volkens' analysis of Federal-level coalitions is arrived at deductively, 
building on formal theoretical models.  This is quite different from the more inductive 
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methodology of Smith's work.  Nevertheless, the conclusions they come to are 
complementary to those put forward by Smith and others.  In particular, there are strong 
parallels between the logical consequences of the 'median legislator' model and the actual 
coalition outcomes that Smith attributed to the Federal Republic's 'politics of centrality'. 
It was noted earlier in the article that key system attributes - such as proportional 
representation (and the five percent hurdle), the idea of the Partienstaat, 'Chancellor 
democracy' and the principle of Richtlinienkompetenz, and the the rule that requires the 
Bundestag to give a 'constructive vote of no confidence' - serve to narrow the ideological 
range of 'relevant' parties, enhance the status of the Chancellor as leader of the coalition, as 
well as increase the opportunity costs of both exit from an existing coalition and the 
formation of rival coalitions.  Taken together, they encourage the qualities of ideological 
moderation, coalition discipline, and governmental stability that Smith has called the politics 
of centrality.  Thus, from the early 1950s and until the early 1980s, the three main parties 
coalesced around the political centre in the kind of triangular relationship described in the 
Pappi model. 
However, as already noted, the net effect of the two historical junctures of 1983 and 
1990 was both to break up this cosy party oligopoly, and to move the centre of gravity within 
the party system to the political left.  Nevertheless, it would take another fifteen years for 
these systemic changes to manifest themselves in coalition terms at the Federal level. 
One reason for this was party ideology.  As Smith notes, for historical reasons, all 
three mainstream parties adhere to the principle of 'militant democracy', one of the 
manifestations of which is an intolerance of parties considered to be insufficiently 
staatserhaltend
34
.  This shunning of 'outsider' parties was particularly acute at the Federal 
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level and served to isolate the Greens throughout the 1980s and, subsequently, the PDS after 
1990.  Thus the real coalition 'win set', made up of parties with sufficient democratic 
credentials, remained limited long after the original triangular party system began to break 
down.  As has been discussed elsewhere, the shutting out of the Greens and PDS benefited the 
CDU/CSU, as it denied the SPD potential coalition options on the political left
35
.  The fact 
that the SPD acquiesced in this is evidence of the degree to which it has become intimately 
associated with the dominant ideology of the Federal Republic over the last fifty years. 
The other reason, however, was purely mathematical.  Up until the 1998 Bundestag 
elections, the balance of party weights within the legislature was such that the FDP retained 
its Mparty status and remained in government.  This is in keeping with the pattern identified 
by Klingemann and Volkens, noted earlier.  The period from 1983 to 1998 was characterised 
by both an uninterrupted sequence of CDU/CSU-FDP coalitions and also a phase of electoral 
decline for the SPD.  As a result, it was not until the 1998 elections that the SPD could muster 
enough seats in the Bundestag to unseat the incumbent coalition.  However, as Table Five 
(below) indicates, the 1998 elections brought about three other changes.  First, the status of 
Mparty moved from the FDP to the SPD – signalling that the shift to the political left within 
the party system had finally manifested itself in terms of seats in the Bundestag.  Second, 
unlike the FDP, the SPD was not only the Mparty, it was also Mparty(k) - making its 
inclusion in any ideologically connected minimal winning coalition inevitable.  Third, the 
new Red-Green coalition signalled a subtle change in the dynamics of coalition formation in 
the Federal Republic.  On the one hand, the presence of the SPD in the new coalition was in 
keeping with the established pattern of the party 'owning' the median legislator in the 
Bundestag being a member of any coalition that formed.  However, in choosing the Greens as 
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their junior partner, the SPD has totally dissolved the old coalition rather than including one 
of the incumbent 
  23 
Table Five.  Bundestag Elections 1983-98
36
.  Predicted and Actual Coalition Outcomes 
(using policy-oriented formation criteria) 
Date of Bundestag Election 
 06/03/83 25/01/87 02/12/90 16/10/94 27/09/98 
Seats in Bundestag 
CDU/CSU 244 223 319 294 245 
FDP 34 46 79 47 44 
SPD 193 186 239 252 298 
Greens 27 42 8 49 47 
PDS --- --- 17 30 35 
Total Seats 498 497 662 672 669 
Minimum Winner 250 249 332 337 335 
Mparty FDP FDP FDP FDP SPD 
Mparty(k)?  No No No No Yes 
Coalition  CDU/CSU-
FDP 
CDU/CSU-
FDP 
CDU/CSU-
FDP 
CDU/CSU-
FDP 
SPD-Greens 
Degree of Change None None None None Total 
 
 
parties (the obvious candidate being the FDP).  This was not, to use Smith's terminology, the 
'partial' change of government that has become the norm in the Federal Republic, but a 
wholesale change.  As a result, for the time being at least one of the constituent parts of 
Smith's idea of the politics of centrality is missing: the Mparty (the epitome of 'centrality') 
remains in government, but there is no continuity of membership between outgoing and 
incoming coalitions. 
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Conclusion: Beyond the Politics of Centrality? 
It remains to be seen how significant the changes of September 1998 will turn out to be.  One 
explanation is that 1998 was a one-off election, where the changes noted earlier were forced 
upon the parties involved, with the proviso that future elections will see a return to the status 
quo ante.  There is evidence to support this.  The Red-Green coalition was not the smallest 
connected winning option that could have formed – an SPD-FDP coalition would have been 
three seats smaller (although the difference would not have been large enough to have a 
significant impact on payoffs).  Moreover, many in the SPD – including Gerhard Schröder - 
had expressed misgivings about the suitability of the Greens as a coalition partner at the 
Federal level (although SPD activists were more enthusiastic)
37
.  It remains unclear why the 
FDP ruled out the option of a coalition with the SPD.  Ideological differences might have 
come into play, and there is evidence of a degree of animosity between Schröder and some 
FDP politicians going back to his days as Minister President of Lower Saxony
38
.  Moreover, it 
has been clear for many years that the FDP tends to suffer at the polls when it defects from an 
established coalition
39
.  One could argue that a combination of all of these factors might have 
made an SPD-FDP coalition impossible at the time.  Nevertheless, it would be unwise to rule 
it out in the future. 
 The other explanation is more profound.  For some time, there has been speculation 
that the extraordinary dominance of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl over the period 1983–
1998 masked a fundamental change in the dynamics of the party system at the Federal level
40
.  
Thus, whilst the emergence of the Greens and PDS led to the creation of significant new 
coalition arrangements at the Länder level
41
, the balance of power at the Federal level 
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appeared frozen.  With Kohl no longer a major player, what we are now seeing is the 
emergence of a more polarised 'two-bloc' system, with a centre-right bloc consisting of the 
CDU/CSU and FDP confronting a centre-left bloc made up of the SPD, Greens and PDS.  Of 
course the PDS is still currently beyond the pale at the Federal level, but is increasingly 
koalitionsfähig in the Länder.  If this was to eventually happen at the Federal level as well, 
the SPD would benefit from another potential partner on the left. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, two potential scenarios arise from this second 
explanation.  The first is that it would be very bad news for the FDP.  If the fluidity of the old 
triangular relationship between the parties has been replaced by a more rigid left-right divide, 
the FDP's former position as 'kingmaker' and 'liberal corrective' would be under threat.  
Moreover, if that was the case, the rationale for voting FDP at all would be far weaker, with 
many voters eschewing the Liberal monkey for the Christian Democratic organ-grinder.  The 
consequences for the FDP under those circumstances would be clear.  The second scenario is 
that the Greens would find it very difficult to usurp the FDP's kingmaker role, a course 
advocated by moderates like Joschka Fischer.  Indeed there would be very little point in 
trying, given the disappearance of the old triangular dynamic. 
If these two scenarios were to come to pass, the Federal Republic's party system would 
have moved beyond the 'politics of centrality'.  But one Bundestag election is not enough 
evidence on which to base such a conclusion and, as already noted, the next Bundestag 
elections may see a return to a more familiar coalition arrangement at the Federal level.  Yet 
even if this is not the case, a return to power of the current Red-Green coalition would in itself 
fit the pattern of stable coalition arrangements that has become the norm since the foundation 
of the Federal Republic.  As such, it would not signal the end of the politics of centrality.  On 
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the contrary, it would be an indication of the underlying stability and integrative power of 
what still remains the Federal Republic's efficient secret. 
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